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Peter Temin 
All too often business enterprises are considered to be the “atoms” of econom- 
ics, the irreducible unit of  analysis. This is a procedure that works well in 
many contexts, which is why it persists. When competitive industries are the 
subject of  analysis, for example, then the assumption that business firms are 
unitary has proven a fruitful starting point. But this approach also has draw- 
backs, since enterprises are complex organizations. This volume contains es- 
says that explore a different view. They look inside the business enterprise. 
The concept of a firm as a simple decision unit has been encouraged by the 
formal similarity between the analysis of  the individual and of the enterprise 
in elementary economic theory. In each case, the person or the business firm 
is represented by a function representing either preferences (for individuals) 
or costs (for enterprises). The description proceeds symmetrically as the par- 
allelism between the preference and cost functions is exploited. The analysis 
begins to differ only when individuals confront their budget constraints and 
enterprises seek to make profits. 
This symmetry can be overdrawn. Many business enterprises have grown 
to be vastly larger and more complicated than individuals or even families. 
They involve the activities of  many people, organized into several layers of 
authority over often diverse locations, product lines, and productive facilities. 
The modern business enterprise can now rival countries in size. 
To  understand this complex organization, it is necessary to look inside the 
business enterprise to examine behavior within the enterprise’s boundaries. 
One cannot assume that a message delivered to one part of a large enterprise 
will make its way to all others. One cannot assume that information generated 
at the shop floor will be clear to top management. One cannot assume that 
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plans  made  in  the  board  room  get  implemented  swiftly  and  uniformly 
throughout the enterprise. 
Different levels of  abstraction are appropriate for different problems. The 
view of the business enterprise as a “black box” is still useful for many ques- 
tions. But there are other problems for which the internal operation of busi- 
ness firms matter. If  we seek to learn about employee compensation, for ex- 
ample, then a look inside the firm is needed. Simple wage payments are only 
the most basic way  of  compensating employees. More complex alternatives 
are used widely, for reasons related to the internal needs of the enterprise. 
Alternatively, if we are investigating how new technology is used by enter- 
prises, we may well want to look inside the firm. As some of  the papers in 
this volume show, enterprises can be organized in ways that allow only certain 
kinds of  information to be used. The absorption of  new  techniques may be 
rendered difficult by the established patterns of communication within the en- 
terprise. 
Finally, the question of American “competitiveness” hovers around all dis- 
cussions of economic progress today. American enterprises operate differently 
from those in, say, Japan. This observation has been widely repeated but not 
yet analyzed enough to know its importance. We  need to characterize the way 
in which American enterprises conduct their business in order to evaluate the 
role of internal processes in the fate of nations. 
The essays in this book make a start in this direction. They all in various 
ways direct their attention to activities inside the business enterprise. They try 
to organize their observations in ways that will be useful to others studying 
these operations. They provide insights for economics students studying the 
American economy, guides for business historians chronicling the progress of 
specific firms, and material for theorists trying to understand how enterprises 
and countries respond to stimuli. 
Even though the essays were written by different people and draw on varied 
materials, they form a unified introduction to the study of the business enter- 
prise. They are drawn together by two underlying themes. 
The first theme is analytic. The essays argue for a specific approach to the 
study of business enterprises. In this view information is the key element to 
the functioning of an enterprise. The scarcity of information gives rise to in- 
stitutional arrangements to economize its use. The complexity of information 
induces simplifications and abstractions, notably in the form of  accounting. 
The use of information evolves as enterprises grow and change, and the ability 
to retrieve and use existing information increases as well. 
The second theme is historical. The modern business enterprise is a creature 
of the last century. Historical examples from a century ago, from the Gilded 
Age before the First World War,  give us a window on the early years of this 
unique organization.  Most of  the essays in this volume concentrate on the 
years around the beginning of  the twentieth century, providing a picture of 
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nineteenth century and forward into current events. But the center of attention 
is the Gilded Age. 
These two themes combine to provide a model for the investigation of com- 
plex business enterprises. This approach can help business historians see the 
common elements in the history of any single enterprise. It may inspire theo- 
rists to model concrete practices of  actual firms. And it should help students 
of economics and economic history to understand how those large organiza- 
tions go about responding to the demands upon them. 
The papers in this volume were presented at a Conference on Microecon- 
omic History at the National Bureau of Economic Research in October 1990. 
The conference was organized by Naomi Lamoreaux, Thomas McCraw, Dan- 
iel Raff, and myself  two economists and two historians from departments of 
economics and history and a business school. We  all hope that this conference 
will be the first of a series on related topics of microeconomic history. 
The six papers fall into three groups. The first two, by  Daniel M. G. Raff 
and myself and by H. Thomas Johnson, present the underlying themes of the 
volume. They discuss the agency problems arising from scarce information, 
and  accounting as a primary means of  communication within  large enter- 
prises. The second two papers, by  Margaret Levenstein and JoAnne Yates, 
discuss the demand for and supply of information in two growing enterprises 
of the Gilded Age. They show how the use of accounting and other informa- 
tion is conditioned by the overall strategy of the enterprise and the technology 
of information transfer and storage. The final two papers, by Naomi R. La- 
moreaux and J. Bradford De Long, turn to the interaction between industrial 
firms and financial intermediaries. They show how some of the important fi- 
nancial institutions of the Gilded Age responded to the changing availability 
of  information  and  how  these  changes affected the  financial environment 
within which business enterprises operated. 
Raff  and I argue in “Business History and Recent Economic Theory” that 
the vertical relations within business enterprises have many important com- 
mon characteristics. These traits derive from the scarcity of information avail- 
able to a superior (often called the principal) about the activities of a subordi- 
nate (called the agent). Limited information gives rise to what economists call 
the principal-agent problem, which renders many simple wage contracts inef- 
ficient. Raff  and I describe various arrangements that have been used to pre- 
serve incentives in the absence of full information. We argue that the problems 
and the solutions are similar at the level of employee compensation, the direc- 
tion of business units, and the finance of  enterprises as a whole. In fact, the 
solutions to these information problems are important determinants of where 
the boundaries of business enterprises lie. 
Johnson, in “Managing by  Remote Control,” traces the history of account- 
ing within American business enterprises from the early nineteenth century to 
today. He finds, rather paradoxically, that nineteenth-century accounting prac- 
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As Johnson sees it, accounting serves (at least) two functions. It informs own- 
ers and top management about the profitability of the firm and its major activ- 
ities.  And it  communicates between  these owners and top managers  on the 
one hand and plant managers on the other. These functions are very different, 
and the modem practice of using the same accounting conventions for both of 
them has distorted incentives at the plant level. Managing “by the numbers” 
gives rise to long production runs and large inventories; it reduces the com- 
munication between producers and their customers. 
These two papers emphasize the consequences to the internal functions of 
business enterprises of scarce information.  The general point is that institu- 
tional arrangements  can offset but not eliminate the problems of insufficient 
information.  The specific point is that accounting tools have been developed 
to summarize the available information and that these tools in turn affect how 
enterprises operate. Examination of principal-agent problems and of account- 
ing provides a way to understand how enterprises respond to new challenges. 
Levenstein,  in “The  Use of  Cost Measures,”  traces the beginning  of  ac- 
counting in the Dow Chemical Company before World War I. She argues that 
the company’s strategy determined its need for information. Cost accounting 
therefore grew and changed as the company  grew and changed its position 
in the  industry.  Her study shows the effects of the demand  for information 
within the enterprise.  She provides numerous concrete examples of internal 
reports, interesting both for what they contain and what they omit. 
Yates, in “Investing in Information,”  describes the changing communica- 
tions  within  the  Scovill  Manufacturing  Company  from the  mid-nineteenth 
century to the early twentieth. She emphasizes the supply of information in a 
complex organization,  noting that information  does not exist if  you cannot 
find it. Levenstein documents the effect of  changing manufacturing technol- 
ogy  on the  demand for internal  information;  Yates  analyzes  the  effects  of 
changing information technology on the supply of internal reporting. She fol- 
lows the transition from handwritten  messages to printed forms, from day- 
books to vertical files.  Even  the limited  information  assumed by  the  other 
authors to be present would not be useful in the absence of the techniques for 
reproduction, transmission, and storage that she describes. 
The two papers by  Levenstein and Yates  provide detailed case studies of 
individual enterprises.  They show how the general problems outlined in the 
earlier papers were worked out in particular cases. And they complement each 
other by emphasizing the demand and supply of information, respectively. 
Lamoreaux  looks  at  financial  enterprises  in  “Information  Problems  and 
Banks’  Specialization  in  Short-Term  Commercial  Lending.”  She traces  the 
development of commercial banks in New England throughout the nineteenth 
century. Scarcity of information about investments in the early nineteenth cen- 
tury led banks to operate as a primitive mutual fund of  investments by bank 
directors. As information became more plentiful, in part for reasons outlined 
by Yates, banks changed their function. They loaned less to insiders who now 5  Introduction 
had access to broader markets, and they loaned more to outsiders about whom 
there was much less information. To  reduce the risk of lending on this open 
market, the banks restricted their loans to short terms. They became modem 
commercial banks. The changing American market and the resulting change 
in  information availability led banks to shift their role within the financial 
structure of the United States and separate the concerns of banks and industrial 
firms.  Investment  financing  was  done  increasingly outside of  commercial 
banks as the twentieth century opened. 
De Long examines investment financing in the Gilded Age in “Did J. P. 
Morgan’s Men Add Value?’  He analyzes the institution that replaced the in- 
vestment function of commercial banks as they specialized in short-term fund- 
ing. He discusses the conflicting views held by  Morgan’s supporters and his 
critics of  the balance between his anticompetitive and efficiency-enhancing 
activities. De Long subjects these views to a test, finding that the presence of 
a Morgan man on the board of a corporation increased its value by about 30 
percent. The higher stock price was accomplished by higher earnings, but the 
mechanism by  which the presence of a Morgan man raised them is unclear. 
Morgan’s men seemed to provide a guarantee to investors of corporate quality. 
They provided the information that commercial banks no longer could fur- 
nish. 
These essays provide a view of  the business enterprise that exposes some 
of its internal workings. They suggest a variety of hypotheses and frameworks 
for further analysis. And they provide a picture of American industry in the 
Gilded Age. This picture is a rough mirror of  the economy today. The ac- 
counting rules  described by  Johnson may  constrain American  firms from 
adapting to new technologies and procedures today. The revolution in  infor- 
mation technology described by  Yates  is similar to the revolution going on 
today with desktop computers and fax machines. And the absence of invest- 
ment  bankers  like  Morgan may  possibly inhibit industrial progress in  the 
United States today. 
All of  these topics deserve further study. They have been introduced here 
from a vantage point that stresses the importance of  scarce information and 
the institutions created to utilize and economize it. This approach is designed 
to be the “atom smasher” of economics and of  business history, to provide a 
way to peer inside the business enterprise and analyze its operation. 
On behalf of the operating committee for the conference, I want to thank 
Martin Feldstein and the National Bureau of Economic Research for financial 
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